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We develop a three-party quantum secret sharing protocol based on arbitrary dimensional quan-
tum states. In contrast to the previous quantum secret sharing protocols, the sender can always
control the state, just using local operations, for adjusting the correlation of measurement directions
of three parties and thus there is no waste of resource due to the discord between the directions.
Moreover, our protocol contains the hidden value which enables the sender to leak no information
of secret key to the dishonest receiver until the last steps of the procedure.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
In classical secret sharing [1, 2], one party, say Alice,
wants to send her message to the other parties (Bob and
Charlie) at a distance. However Alice suspects that one
of the others may be dishonest, and she does not know
who is the dishonest one. She tries to divide the se-
cret message into two pieces and give the proper relation
between them so that Bob and Charlie can decode the
message only if they cooperate in the same place.
Hillery et al. [3] first proposed a quantum secret shar-
ing scheme with a tripartite entangled state called the
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [4], which was
generalized into quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocols
on any higher dimensional systems using a N -party N -
level singlet state of total spin zero [5]. However, the
protocols still have the restriction that the number of
participants should be the same as the dimension of each
particle.
In this paper we construct a QSS protocol which does
not have such a limit, and which contains a hidden value
controlling the correlation among outcomes of three par-
ties. Moreover, we show that our protocol based on GHZ-
like states can be more efficient than any previous QSS
protocols, by allowing Alice to manage and to rotate the
states locally according to the measurement directions of
Bob and Charlie.
Most of quantum cryptographic protocols assure that
malicious eavesdropper cannot get the exact information
about private key and can be detected with a specific
probability when she measures a given state in the wrong
direction. Thus, in order for QSS protocols to be se-
cure, Eve’s wrong measurement should give rise to un-
certainty as much as possible. On this account, two mu-
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tually unbiased basis (MUB) measurements [6, 7, 8] on
d-dimensional quantum systems play an important role
in our protocol.
In Section II we consider the generalized Pauli opera-
tors acting on d-dimensional systems, and derive MUBs
and the GHZ-like states. We provide our QSS protocol
based on the GHZ-like states in Section III, and analyze
the security of the protocol for two cases of attacks in
Section IV, where one is an eavesdropping by Eve, and
the other is the intercept-and-resend attack by dishonest
person. We finally summarize our results in Section V.
II. GHZ-LIKE STATES ON d-DIMENSIONAL
QUANTUM SYSTEMS
In this section, we derive two MUBs and GHZ-like
states on d-dimensional quantum systems, and investi-
gate their properties related with the security of our pro-
tocol. First, we consider the generalized Pauli operators
acting on d-dimensional Hilbert space.
X˜ =
d−1∑
j=0
|j + 1〉〈j|, Z˜ =
d−1∑
j=0
ωj|j〉〈j|, (1)
Y˜ = X˜Z˜ =
d−1∑
j=0
ωj|j + 1〉〈j|, (2)
where ω = e2pii/d is a primitive d-th root of unity. Let
|kx〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ω−kj |j〉. (3)
Then |kx〉 is an eigenstate of X˜ with eigenvalue ωk. Let
|ky〉 =


1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ω
j2−2kj−j
2 |j〉 if d is odd,
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ω
j2−2kj−2j
2 |j〉 if d is even.
(4)
2Then |ky〉 is an eigenstate of Y˜ with eigenvalue ωk if d is
odd and with eigenvalue ωk
√
w if d is even.
For each d, the set of eigenstates {|kx〉 : k ∈ Zd} of X˜
forms an orthonormal basis for a d-dimensional quantum
system, and so does {|ky〉 : k ∈ Zd} of Y˜ . Furthermore,
they are mutually unbiased to each other, that is, for any
k, k′ ∈ Zd
|〈kx|k′y
〉| = 1√
d.
In our protocol, two MUB measurements, X =
{|kx〉〈kx| : k ∈ Zd} and Y = {|ky〉〈ky| : k ∈ Zd}, are
alternatively used.
Let us construct a three-party entangled state
|Ψ(α)〉XY Y =
1
d
∑
s+t+u=α (mod d)
|sx〉|ty〉|uy〉, (5)
where α ∈ Zd. Then we can readily obtain
|Ψ(α)〉XY Y =


1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ωj(j−1−α)|jjj〉 if d is odd,
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ωj(j−2−α)|jjj〉 if d is even.
(6)
Similarly we can derive an entangled state |Ψ(α)〉XXX
as follows:
|Ψ(α)〉XXX =
1
d
∑
s+t+u=α (mod d)
|sx〉|tx〉|ux〉
=
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ω−jα|jjj〉. (7)
It is easy to check that |Ψ(1)〉XY Y and |Ψ(0)〉XXX are
the same for d = 2, and furthermore both |Ψ(α)〉XY Y and
|Ψ(α)〉XXX are essentially equivalent to the standard d-
dimensional GHZ state up to local unitary operations.
In particular, it follows from Eqs. (6) and (7) that
|Ψ(α)〉XY Y = (U ⊗ I ⊗ I)|Ψ(α)〉XXX
=
1
d
∑
s+t+u=α (mod d)
U |sx〉|tx〉|ux〉, (8)
where
U =


d−1∑
j=0
ωj(j−1)|j〉〈j| if d is odd,
d−1∑
j=0
ωj(j−2)|j〉〈j| if d is even.
(9)
In this point of view, we call these states the GHZ-like
states.
We now show that |Ψ(α)〉XY Y is the uniquely deter-
mined common eigenstate of XY Y , Y XY and Y Y X
with respect to eigenvalue ωα if d is odd (ωα+1 if d is
even). Let d be odd and assume that an arbitrary 3-
qudit pure state |φ〉 =∑j,k,l ajkl|jkl〉 satisfies
XY Y |φ〉 = Y XY |φ〉 = Y Y X |φ〉 = ωα|φ〉. (10)
It follows from straightforward calculations that
|φ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ωj(j−1−α)|jjj〉 = |Ψ(α)〉XY Y . (11)
Similarly, if d is even, we also have
|φ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ωj(j−2−α)|jjj〉 = |Ψ(α)〉XY Y . (12)
Moreover, we can see that |Ψ(α)〉XY Y = |Ψ(α)〉Y XY =
|Ψ(α)〉Y YX . Hence, if Alice, Bob and Charlie measure|Ψ(α)〉XY Y by XY Y , Y XY , or Y Y X , then they obtain
outcomes s, t and u satisfying that s+t+u = α (mod d),
respectively.
III. OUR PROTOCOL
In QSS, Bob and Charlie obtain the Alice’s private
key from the correlation of outcomes, given by measur-
ing a three-party entangled quantum systems. In fact,
Bob and Charlie can get Alice’s information by the joint
measurement such as Bell measurement if they are to-
gether at same place. This is the same situation as QKD
like BB84 or EPR protocols [9, 10].
However, QSS protocol proceeds in the condition that
they are far away from each other and measure their
states locally. Non-locality and entanglement distributed
between them are, after all, used to give a correlation
between their classical outcomes by local measurements.
Therefore, one of the most important problem in QSS is
how Alice sends an entangled state to Bob and Charlie
securely against eavesdropping by any exterior Eve and
the intercept-and-resend attack by an interior dishonest
person. In order to construct the QSS protocol satisfy-
ing the above conditions, we use two MUB measurements
given in Section II.
1. Alice prepares a GHZ-like state, |Ψ(α)〉XY Y , and
sends Bob and Charlie the last two particles, re-
spectively. Alice repeats this step 2n times, and
all participants store their particles in the order re-
ceived.
2. Bob and Charlie publicly announce the fact that
they have already received all 2n particles from Al-
ice, and then they measure their own qudits after
deciding one of measurement directions X and Y
randomly.
3. Alice informs Bob and Charlie a randomly chosen
2n bit string b, each entry of which is either 0 or
3State Bob Charlie Alice
|Ψ(α)〉
XYY
Y Y X
|Ψ(α)〉
XYY
Y X Y
|Ψ(α)〉
XYY
X Y Y
|Ψ(α)〉
XYY
X X UXU
†
TABLE I: Alice’s measurements corresponding to Bob’s and
Charlie’s: U is the local unitary operation which transforms
|Ψ(α)〉
XXX
into |Ψ(α)〉
XYY
in Eq. (9).
1. Then for i-th particles corresponding to bi = 1
Alice requires Bob and Charlie to announce their
measurement outcomes and directions in the order
randomly determined as either [(i) Bob’s outcome,
(ii) Charlie’s outcome, (iii) Charlie’s direction, (iv)
Bob’s direction] or [(i) Charlie’s outcome, (ii) Bob’s
outcome, (iii) Bob’s direction, (iv) Charlie’s direc-
tion].
4. Alice properly measures her i-th particles corre-
sponding to bi = 1 in the direction correlated with
measurement of Bob and Charlie as in TABLE I.
5. If Alice finds any error from all participants’ mea-
surement outcomes in Step 4, then she aborts the
protocol. Otherwise, they discard the particles for
the test, and Alice lets Bob and Charlie announce
their measurement directions for the particles left
after the test.
6. Alice properly measures her particles in the direc-
tion perfectly correlated with measurement of Bob
and Charlie as in TABLE I.
7. When Bob and Charlie collaborate to obtain Alice’s
information, Alice announces the hidden value α to
Bob and Charlie. Then they can derive her private
key string from the outcome correlation, s+ t+u =
α (mod d).
Note that it is possible to use a string consisting of
different hidden values for GHZ-like states, instead of
the fixed α.
IV. SECURITY
A. Eavesdropping by exterior Eve
In section II, we have shown that |Ψ(α)〉XY Y is the
unique pure three-party quantum state invariant under
operators XY Y , Y XY and Y Y X simultaneously, with
respect to an eigenvalue ωα if d is odd (ωα+1 if d is even).
This means that if
|Ψ〉 =
d−1∑
j,k,l=0
ajkl|jkl〉ABC |Rjkl〉E (13)
successfully passes the test of our protocol then |Ψ〉
should be a product state
|Ψ〉 = |Ψ(α)〉XY Y ⊗ |R〉E . (14)
In other words, after the test of our protocol, Eve is per-
fectly separated and the perfect correlation, s+ t+u = α
(mod d), is securely preserved among all participants.
Therefore, our protocol is secure against any exterior
Eve’s eavesdropping.
B. Intercept-and-resend attack by interior
dishonest party
In this section, we consider the case that one of re-
ceivers Bob and Charlie changes his mind and tries to
obtain Alice’s private key alone. Suppose a dishonest
person (Bob) performs the intercept-and-resend attack
on Charlie’s particles.
First, Bob can intercept, measure by predicting the
measurement direction of Charlie, and resend the col-
lapsed state to him. If Bob and Charlie measure Char-
lie’s original states in the same directions, then Bob can
obtain the information about Alice’s private key alone af-
ter knowing the hidden value α. Although Bob performs
measurements in the directions different from Charlie, his
attacks can be unexposed with probability 1/d. There-
fore, the exposed probability is not less than 1− (d+12d
)n
during the test procedure and we can find out that the
higher dimensional system provides us with the better
security for QSS protocol. This is due to the fact that
the number of eigenspaces of measurement linearly in-
creases as the dimension of system gets higher, and that
it is also difficult for Bob to obtain the same result as
Charlie’s when n is sufficiently large.
We now assume that Bob possesses all states Alice sent
and gives Charlie one sides of d-dimensional bipartite
(maximally entangled) states. In Step 3 of our protocol,
the measurement directions and outcomes of Bob and
Charlie are alternately announced in a specific way. As
in [11], this procedure prevent dishonest Bob from cheat-
ing the other members. Therefore, our protocol is also
secure against intercept-and-resend attacks by an interior
dishonest member.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a 3-party d-level QSS protocol.
To construct a QSS protocol on arbitrary d-dimensional
quantum systems, we have derived MUBs on Hilbert
space Cd ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd, which guarantees the security of
our protocol. Especially, with the explicit formula for
the exposed probability, we have shown that the higher
dimensional system assures the better security for QSS
protocol.
4In addition to the security, our protocol is more effi-
cient than any other protocols since the number of dis-
carding entangled states is minimized in our protocol by
controlling Alice’s measurements according to measure-
ments of Bob and Charlie. Furthermore, in contrast to
the previously known QSS protocols, Bob and Charlie
have no information about Alice’s private key because of
the hidden value or string α, although he is not detected
in the middle of test.
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